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poet, Marcel Ollivier and Peter Demetz,4 Ollivier describes above all the discovery of the manuscripts, finding their literary merit dubious at best. He suggests that at age eighteen Marx took the writing of verse so seriously that we may suppose that he aspired at least briefly to be a poet. This view is shared by Demetz, who stresses the thorough training in late XVIIIthcentury poetry which Karl had received from his father. But in exploring some probable models for Marx's verse, Demetz glosses over those themes in Marx which have no obvious precedent. Both Ollivier and Demetz appear to assume a lack of continuity between the versifier of 1837 and the thinker of the early 1840's and later.
Yet an obvious continuity between Marx's verse and his later work lies in the style of his writing. His love of metaphor, his use of allusions, his construction of-complex sentences all bear witness to his early exercises as a composer of verse.5 A second continuity is the fact that Marx used to read the works of Aeschylus through every year, in the Greek. 6 We may suppose that he read the plays in part in order to savor their style-as well as to contemplate the trials of Prometheus, Orestes, and Eteocles in their contest with the usurper of the cosmos, Zeus. Long after Marx had ceased to write it, he retained a fondness for verse. Still, if Marx's early verse-making did nothing more than indicate something about the roots of his prose style and his taste for Greek tragedy, perhaps the verse would deserve the neglect it has received. But there is more to the matter. In this note we shall investigate two deeper continuities between Marx's verse and his early philosophy.
The Marx proceeds to expand this critique as follows:
The philosopher, himself an abstract form of alienated man, sets himself up as the measure of the alienated world.14 To set himself up as the measure of the world is precisely the ambition of Hegel's which Marx castigates in his epigram of 1837. In his world of thought, Hegel can only play at God, and in so doing he rivals God merely in obscurity and self-concealment. Thus as early as 1837 Marx has enunciated the theme that idealist philosophy is an abstraction, divorced from the real world and blind to its own separation from reality.
On all life to its abstractions ("useful tool"). Indeed, the theme which unites Marx's critique of physicians with his rejection of Hegel is his hostility to abstractness. Above all, Marx wanted men to pay homage to life in all its concreteness of appetite and feeling. The unifying motif of Marx's satires on physicians is that the doctors are philistines.'8 This attack on philistinism is the second major theme of Marx's satiric verse. As an example, he derides those physicians who lack the capacity or desire to evaluate correctly the place of their work in society. Like all philistines they tend to exaggerate their own importance, while ignoring the needs of others.
Marx does not limit his critique of philistinism to physicians. In the first of his "Epigramme," he expresses his contempt for the German public. Above all, he satirizes the penchant of Germans to belittle and even to ignore a political crisis until it is safely past. But once it is over, these know-nothings feel impelled to theorize about it, in a vain effort to explain it away. Such people constitute a kind of political philistine. The German public wants only to theorize about a political clash, in order to rationalize it out of existence. But the Germans dare to fly so naively in the face of the facts only after the crisis has passed, having played ostrich for its duration.
Marx's scorn for mere theorizing in the face of political upheaval is a major theme of his later thought. He expresses the priority of practice over theory trenchantly in the second of his "Theses on Feuerbach" (1845):
The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but a practical question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.21
Here we see an hostility to abstractions such as that which prompted his satire on physicians and his epigrams against Hegel. We may assume that in Marx's view only a reading public which could ignore political tempests would welcome the abstract theodicy of Hegel and the impractical theology of the physicians. This suggests that the foundation of Marx's attack both on theorists and on philistines lies in his awareness of their political inertness. A supine public, doped on Hegel and other purveyors of abstractions, could do nothing to improve man's lot in society. Such a public would remain forever "cozy and stupid." It would be, in a word, bourgeois.
Besides his contempt for the bourgeois German public, a second lifelong attitude in Marx which we may trace back to the verse of 1837 is his emphasis on the isolation of the creative individual within society. In his poems, Marx depicts the artist as a creator who lives solely for his art, and this dedication to art makes him misunderstood by everyone. Thus the artist is portrayed as a victim of alienation. Indeed, at first glance it may seem that here Marx is expressing a whole series of romantic commonplaces. The artist as a man in league with the powers of darkness, the musician as the supreme artist, the power of music to intoxicate the soul, the scorn of the artist for the restraints of the social order-these themes are familiar in Germany from Wackenroder, Tieck, and Novalis in the 1790's on down to Platen, Lenau, and Heine in the 1830's. Marx, however, voices these sentiments with a fury that suggests rebellion of a starker sort than mere poetic Weltschmerz. Unlike Novalis, who dreams of dying in the magic of the night, Marx has his artist threaten to kill the unappreciative listener. This artist carries a sabre, as well as a violin and bow. He wishes to slay hearts with his music, but he also threatens to slay critics with his sword. A musician who is willing to kill for his art, as well as to die for it, is no ordinary Romantic l While it may be going too far to say that this minstrel is an incipient revolutionary, it is plain that his estrangement from society is total. He lives uniquely for his art, as a dedicated revolutionary lives uniquely for his cause. In temperament, Marx's minstrel is a born despiser of the social order. It is not far-fetched to say that out of this minstrel a revolutionary is waiting to be born. And even if we ignore Marx's post-1846 vocation as a revolutionary, his portrait of the artist as the alienated individual par excellence suggests that his own sense of alienation may have deepened enormously during 1836 and 1837. During his first year in Berlin, he adopted the cliches of romanticism with a vengeance. He went so far as to depict the poet as a kind of sacrificial victim to the powers of darkness, a victim who performs his rite because the devil leaves him no choice.
But if we follow out the romantic stereotype, we may suppose that behind this image lies the hope, albeit unexpressed, that the sacrifice made by the poet may liberate others from similar dark forces within themselves.
The poet then emerges as a kind of unwitting liberator of mankind. This is the role which in the 1830's Heine undertook to play consciously, as a man of letters, and which Marx later was to condemn in Heine.26 For by 1845 Marx, frustrated poet, had already learned that words unaccompanied by actions change nothing, except men's visions. And Marx, like the Aeschylean hero Prometheus, wanted to change the world itself.
University of Massachusetts.

